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Aleatory Realism: 
Reflections on the Parable of the Pier-Glass 
 
 
Matthew Beaumont 
 
 
Abstract  
This article challenges the simplistic conception of realism sponsored by postmodernist thought, through a re-
engagement with those moments in George Eliot's fiction in which she reflects self-consciously on realist 
representation. After re-examining the opening of Adam Bede, which is notable for its experimental attitude to 
realism, the article proceeds to a discussion of the famous metaphor of the pier-glass sketched in Middlemarch. 
This metaphor, the article contends, offers a glimpse of a realism beyond realism, in which the realist aesthetic 
collapses, and reality appears instead in the form of unmediated, unprocessed matter. The article identifies this 
inchoate, almost unthinkable form of representation, which it associates with the perspectival device called 
anamorphosis, as ‘aleatory realism.’ 
 
 
In the intellectual climate of the last few decades, a climate that can most conveniently be identified 
with the name ‘postmodernism,’ realism has been almost programmatically marginalised. 
Postmodernism, which might be defined in telegraphic form, after Terry Eagleton, as “the 
contemporary movement of thought which rejects totalities, universal values, grand historical 
narratives, solid foundations to human existence and the possibility of objective knowledge” (13), has 
made an impatient attitude to realism seem almost compulsory for critics. In particular, the more 
militant postmodernists have crudely caricatured realism, both as a philosophical disposition and as 
an aesthetic, claiming that it assumes a fundamentally unproblematic relationship between reality and 
its representations. In one especially influential account of postmodernism, Jean-François Lyotard 
even insisted that realism, which he audaciously located “between academicism and kitsch,” is defined 
precisely by its intention “to avoid the question of reality implicated in that of art” (“Answering” 75). 
Realism, for him, is an unsophisticated, fatally empiricist form that is simply too ham-fisted to grasp 
the philosophical problems it spontaneously poses. So, although specialist scholars, especially critics 
of nineteenth-century literature like George Levine, have stubbornly continued to explore its historic 
importance, realism has come to seem hopelessly simple-minded to most intellectuals in the 
humanities. It is as if Roland Barthes’ brilliant critique, in the late 1960s, of what he called the 
“referential illusion,” and his concomitant attempts to decode the “reality effects” that literary texts 
evoke in order to certify their claims to verisimilitude (148), has served as a pretext, not so much for 
rethinking realism in relation to poststructuralist insights about narrative convention, as for forgetting 
about realism altogether. 
 
The concordance of “Names and Terms” in one representative Companion to Postmodernism is in 
this respect revealing. It slides seamlessly from an entry on “Readerly texts” to one on “Reed, 
Ishmael,” silently suppressing the significance of realism, either as a positive or a negative 
phenomenon (Sim 296). In its entry on “Representation,” furthermore, it makes no reference to realist 
aesthetics, though it does identify the “denial of “reality” itself as such” as a prominent feature of 
poststructuralist thought (297). If textbooks on postmodernism do allude specifically to realism, they 
tend to impugn the concept both for its ingenuousness and its disingenuousness. The Postmodern 
Arts: An Introductory Reader, for example, contains a concise anthology of terms in which realism is 
identified as “the antithesis of postmodern practice.” On the one hand, realism is simple-minded: 
“From the postmodern position realism is inadequate because it implies an unexamined relationship 
with some prior reality.” On the other hand, it is duplicitous: “In so far as realism pretends to offer an 
unproblematic representation, it is in fact the most deceptive form of representation, reproducing its 
assumptions through the audience’s unexamined response to an apparently natural image or text” 
(Wheale 51). This definition caricatures realism—in consequence it no doubt caricatures “the 
postmodern position” too—as an exercise in illusionism that is at once naïve and intellectually 
duplicitous. It implies that all realism is a species of trompe l’oeil, an act of representation that, in 
replicating empirical reality as exactly as possible, dreams of attaining a complete correspondence to 
it. It is a conception of realism that at the same time overstates its mimetic ambitions and 
dramatically undervalues its ability to exhibit and examine the formal limitations that shape it. 
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It is certainly not a conception of realism that can reasonably be inferred from the experience of 
reading a canonical realist fiction such as George Eliot’s Adam Bede (1859). For Adam Bede radically 
rethinks the realist aesthetic even as it reaffirms its author’s absolutely firm moralist commitment to 
the realism that she discerned in John Ruskin’s criticism; that is, to “the doctrine that all truth and 
beauty are to be attained by a humble and faithful study of nature, and not by substituting vague 
forms, bred by imagination on the mists of feeling, in place of definite, substantial reality” (Selected 
Critical Writings 248). Openly and restlessly conscious of its rhetorical strategies throughout, as the 
famous disquisition on the democratic avocation of realism in Chapter 17 makes apparent, Eliot’s 
novel is supremely self-reflexive. It illustrates Levine’s claim that “realism makes the difficulties of the 
work of representation inescapably obvious to the writer” (16). It is thus a meditation on both the 
necessity and the impossibility of what Eliot mischievously calls the obligation “to creep servilely after 
nature and fact” (Adam Bede 177).  
 
The opening paragraph of Adam Bede is exemplary in this respect. In establishing the foundations of 
the historical reality that she is about to reconstruct, Eliot at the same time renders them utterly 
unstable: 
 
With a single drop of ink for a mirror, the Egyptian sorcerer undertakes to reveal to any chance comer far-
reaching visions of the past. This is what I undertake to do for you, reader. With this drop of ink at the end 
of my pen I will show you the roomy workshop of Mr Jonathan Burge, carpenter and builder in the village 
of Hayslope, as it appeared on the eighteenth of June, in the year of our Lord 1799. (7) 
 
Here, Eliot explicitly establishes a contract with the reader, as the opening sentences of all fictions 
must at least implicitly do: “This is what I undertake to do for you, reader” (7). This contract, though, 
is the stuff of a solicitor’s nightmare, because it is interlarded with contradictions that are expressly 
designed to leave the reader confused. Is the reader to expect a kind of fantasia of the past, as the 
reference in the first sentence to those “far-reaching visions,” which seem to evoke the “vague forms, 
bred by imagination” that she vehemently dismisses in the account of Ruskin, indicates? Or is the 
reader to expect instead a representation almost as solid and tangible as a three-dimensional stage set, 
its concrete forms attained by a humble and faithful study of nature, as the image of the “roomy 
workshop” in the third sentence suggests? Is the narrator a sorcerer or a carpenter? That image of the 
single, globular drop of ink, which acts both as a microscopic lens and as a convex surface that 
resolves the phenomena it reflects into the most fantastical shapes, implies that the past, and 
specifically the 18th June 1799, is the object both of scientific intellection and the necromantic 
imagination. The novel’s experiment in representation appears to be as closely related to the spiritual 
séance as to the scene of empirical science.  
 
The narrator’s contract with the reader, deliberately confusing on all these counts, in a double sense 
contains the inherent contradictions of realism’s attempt to reconstruct or resurrect a past that has 
effectively been lost, a past that, under the conditions of industrial and agrarian change characteristic 
of the first half of the nineteenth century, is no longer empirically available. And it mischievously 
exploits the alienated conditions of production and consumption that prevail in mid nineteenth-
century literature—even as it is self-evidently unsettled and upset by them. Specifically, it attempts to 
negotiate the increasingly anonymous character, in a rapidly expanding literary marketplace, of the 
relationship between writer and reader. For a book’s readership, atomised as it has become, can no 
longer confidently be identified as a definite constituency. The consumer of nineteenth-century 
fiction, like the individuals that comprise the sorcerer’s casual audience, is a “chance comer.” The 
producer is therefore forced by the same token to perform acts of illusionism in order to attract an 
audience, like some magician standing in the souk perhaps, or like someone simply selling an ordinary 
commodity in the marketplace. Eliot’s formal games, in the opening paragraph of Adam Bede, can 
thus be understood, in the context of this changing relationship (a context that is ultimately that of the 
transformations of industrial capitalism itself), as an attempt precisely to maintain the openness, the 
experimental value of realism, as it shapes its readership. The concept of realism that Eliot operates is 
a distinctly dialectical one, then, in addition to an openly democratic one. It is a dynamic force field 
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rather than some static phenomenon. It accommodates “vague forms” as well as concrete ones, and, as 
Eliot’s late fiction such as Daniel Deronda (1876) testifies, it activates social visions as well as social 
facts. 
 
In the light of this, Eliot’s notion of realism appears to be poorly served by a definition like the one 
proposed in The Postmodern Arts. (No doubt the formulation “in so far as realism pretends to offer 
an unproblematic representation, it is in fact the most deceptive form of representation,” is an implicit 
admission that the claim that this book makes about the form is finally simplistic and unconvincing). 
The unreliability of the familiar opposition between realism and modernism or postmodernism that 
some commentators still expect to obtain can in fact be tested in relation to the opening of Adam 
Bede. For the first paragraph of Eliot’s novel, in all its self-consciousness, might be said to resemble a 
modernist or postmodernist fiction, if in the current critical climate this did not necessarily imply that 
its formal qualities are interesting only to the extent that they anticipate later literary developments. It 
is important not to fall into the trap of congratulating a realist novel for being proto-modernist or 
proto-postmodernist largely on the grounds that it has demonstrated an intuitive, if ultimately 
fumbling understanding of its own formal limitations. That said, the beginning of Adam Bede is 
remarkable for its self-reflexiveness: it emphasises the materiality of writing; it foregrounds the 
illusionistic character of representation; and it directly, playfully addresses the reader. It is thus 
scarcely less sophisticated, in its cautious, self-conscious attention to the difficulties of realist 
representation, than the first chapter of Jacob’s Room (1922), often described as Virginia Woolf’s first 
modernist fiction, which is also stained—and sustained—by a drop of ink from a pen (3). 
 
Eliot’s experimental attitude to the demands of realist narrative requires a concept of realism that 
escapes its limited definition in terms of a passive, positivistic reflection of banal social reality—in 
terms of what Woolf bemoaned in her diary as “this appalling narrative business of the realist: getting 
on from lunch to dinner” (Diary 209). It might be more productive, as Fredric Jameson has argued, 
“if we can manage to think of realism as a form of demiurgic practice; if we can restore some active 
and even playful/experimental impulses to the inertia of its appearance as a copy or representation of 
things” (Signatures 162). Adam Bede, the product of both sorcery and carpentry, so to speak, 
demands to be understood in these dynamic terms, as a form of demiurgic practice, albeit one that 
aspires, as Eliot puts it, to offering “no more than a faithful account of men and things as they have 
mirrored themselves” in the author’s mind (Adam Bede 177). It resists postmodernist attempts to 
limit it to an act of mechanical reflection, insisting that “the mirror is doubtless defective; the outlines 
will sometimes be disturbed; the reflection faint or confused” (Adam Bede 177). 
 
In the space that remains, I propose to analyse one more classic passage from George Eliot in order to 
illustrate the importance of rethinking realism, in opposition to postmodernism, though in the spirit, 
perhaps, of a certain post-structuralism, by examining again the tropes it uses to conceptualise itself 
in the nineteenth century. I hope to demonstrate that in Middlemarch (1871-72), another 
quintessentially canonical realist fiction, Eliot at one point invokes, and at the same instant exorcises, 
what might be characterised as a realism beyond realism. This realism beyond realism is not so much 
implemented as briefly glimpsed in Middlemarch, in the famous “parable” of the pier-glass sketched 
in the opening paragraph of Chapter 27:  
 
An eminent philosopher among my friends, who can dignify even your ugly furniture by lifting it into the 
serene light of science, has shown me this pregnant little fact. Your pier-glass or extensive surface of 
polished steel made to be rubbed by a housemaid, will be minutely and multitudinously scratched in all 
directions; but place now against it a lighted candle as a centre of illumination, and lo! the scratches will 
seem to arrange themselves in a fine series of concentric circles round that little sun. It is demonstrable 
that the scratches are going everywhere impartially, and it is only your candle which produces the 
flattering illusion of concentric arrangement, its light falling with an exclusive optical selection. (217)  
 
The realism that Eliot practises in Middlemarch is one that organises social reality according to the 
perspective of the omniscient narrator, who serves, like the lighted candle, to resolve it into a series of 
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concentric circles that render it comprehensible. It is the principal function of this narrator, as 
Elizabeth Ermarth has persuasively claimed, to enforce the ideological consensus on which realism is 
predicated: “The genial consensus of realistic narration implies a unity in human experience which 
assures us that we all inhabit the same world and that the same meanings are available to everyone” 
(65). In the absence of this perspective, however, social reality is nothing more than a chaos of 
indiscriminate scratches, minute and multitudinous. The consensus collapses, and reality appears 
instead in the immediate, that is, unmediated, form of unprocessed matter. The image of the pier-
glass thus momentarily conjures up the appalling prospect of a realism of the Real, a realism that 
represents, or posits at least, precisely that which is absolutely resistant to representation. The mirror 
is defective not simply because, as for Eliot in Adam Bede, its outlines are disturbed and its reflections 
faint or confused; it is defective because its entire surface is arbitrarily crosshatched by meaningless 
scratches. Here is a realism of sheer contingency. I intend to call this inchoate, almost unthinkable 
form of representation ‘aleatory realism.’  
 
In order to adumbrate this concept, I must first explore the idea of anamorphosis, a pictorial device 
used by some sixteenth- and seventeenth-century painters, for I believe it provides the most 
productive means of thinking about alternatives to the linear narrative perspective conventionally 
associated with so-called classic realism.1 Anamorphosis, taken from the Greek meaning to transform 
or form again, is a technique for producing pictorial images that contradict or derange the logic of 
linear perspective. According to its first theorist, Jean-François Niceron, the point of anamorphic art 
was to generate figures “which, away from the predetermined view-point, seem distorted and 
nonsensical, but seen from the proper view-point will appear correctly proportioned” (La Perspective 
curieuse [1638]; cited in Baltrušaitis 164). Anamorphosis effectively offered sixteenth-century 
painters and their successors a pictorial language with which to articulate both the ambitions of the 
emergent realist aesthetic and its limitations. I contend that an anamorphic perspective offered 
nineteenth-century novelists a comparable opportunity for probing the possibilities of realism in 
literature.  
 
I am not the first critic to make this contention. In an article on “plot pattern” in nineteenth-century 
fiction, Ilya Kliger has for example recently made suggestive use of the formulation “anamorphic 
realism.” Anamorphosis, according to Kliger, is “a truth discourse in narrative fiction [which] refers to 
the process whereby an illegible textual instance, something altogether incomprehensible to the hero, 
emerges as the very truth-object for which the hero has been looking elsewhere” (296). In my 
reflections on realism, I am less interested in the epistemological implications that this “illegible 
textual instance” retrospectively has for the reader’s conception of character and plot than in its 
existential challenge, so to speak, to the logic of omniscient narration. The anamorphic vision of 
reality evoked by the image of the pier-glass is equivalent to one of those elements in the classic realist 
text that, according to Colin McCabe, “escape the control of the dominant discourse in the same way 
as a neurotic symptom or verbal slip attest to the lack of control of the conscious subject” (19).  
 
One sixteenth-century painting is particularly important for the development of anamorphosis, and I 
want to explicate it quite carefully before returning to Eliot’s metaphor of the pier-glass. The 
Ambassadors (1533), housed in the National Gallery in London, is Hans Holbein the Younger’s 
famous double portrait of Jean de Dinteville and Georges de Selve. It is, manifestly, a meditation on 
the intellectual and artistic accomplishments of Europe in an epoch of imperial expansion. The 
luxuriously robed table that stands at the centre of the composition, framed by the casually posed 
forms of the French ambassadors themselves, is heaped with exquisite objects pertaining to the 
disciplines of geometry, astronomy, mathematics and music. Holbein deploys the comparatively 
recent techniques of oil painting both to spiritualise these objects and to underline their materiality. 
His obsessive reproduction of the different textures that define them, which enables the spectator to 
appraise them sensuously, as well as simply visually, is an attempt to mime the combination of 
expensive materials and specialist, skilled labour that constitutes them, and so to represent their 
status as commodities. As John Berger once pointed out, in the sixteenth century, oil paintings “had to 
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be able to demonstrate the desirability of what money could buy” (91). But in addition to 
demonstrating that the objects they so patiently depicted were commodities, oil paintings increasingly 
advertised themselves as commodities. Holbein thus celebrates the commodity status of painting itself 
even as he claims that realist painting is the supreme medium for sanctifying the accoutrements of 
secular authority.  
 
So Holbein identifies the spectator standing before this portrait as someone for whom the consecrated 
objects that solicit his attention from the centre of the composition, and the cultural values indelibly 
inscribed in them, are in the end purchasable, possessable commodities. It does so partly via the 
spectator’s identification with Dinteville and Selve: the spectator stands opposite the table situated 
between them, so that he completes a triangular relationship that seems to institutionalize his 
inclusion in the social sphere that they occupy and that he aspires to. Their coolly inclusive gaze, 
which is levelled at the spectator so as to seem both seductive and faintly defiant, reinforces the sense 
that he is a tolerated presence in this sphere. Holbein’s painstaking reconstruction of the three-
dimensional space inhabited by the ambassadors, which is based on an elaborate application of 
perspective, as the geometric patterns on the mosaic floor most obviously indicate, also contributes to 
this process of identification, because it extends the sense of effortless command that these statesmen 
emblematise to the spectator himself. In the virtual space mapped out by this composition the 
spectator is transmuted into a proprietor, someone who is potentially in command of its constituent 
objects.  
 
At this point, the analogy between realist painting in the sixteenth century and realist literature in the 
nineteenth century probably begins to emerge more clearly. Realist art—the development of which is 
inseparable from the rise of Renaissance humanism—is linear in its approach to representation. It 
unifies time and space, creating the impression that reality is knowable and can be directly 
apprehended, by positing a singular, stable spectator. Realist fiction functions in a comparable 
manner. To recapitulate Ermarth’s point, “fictional realism is an aesthetic form of consensus, its 
touchstone being the agreement between the various viewpoints made available by a text” (ix-x). 
Realist literature constructs its narrator, and by extension its reader too, as the site at which this 
consensus about what can be identified as objective, in fictional terms, is imaginatively co-ordinated. 
It is in this respect that it is like realist painting, which exploits the laws of perspective to position the 
spectator at the point at which it is possible to achieve an illusion of objectivity. In both cases, the 
apparent identity, the supposed meaningfulness, of the empirical world is reinforced. “The consensus 
of realism,” Ermarth confirms, “produces in literature a rationalization of consciousness analogous to 
the rationalization of sight evident in realistic painting” (4).  
But to reconstruct Holbein’s portrait as I have done above is to ignore its most strikingly incongruous 
element: the smeared image that, famously, slices across the picture’s surface and inauspiciously 
ruptures its perspective. The philosopher of science Bruno Latour has vividly described its distortive 
impact on the spectator’s relationship to the painting:  
 
If the attendants at the National Gallery of London allow you to kneel down at the painting’s left side, your 
face as if touching the varnished pigment, this unidentified flying object will appear to be a skull—the 
accepted symbol of the many memento mori painted at the time. But then, how will the fiery Ambassadors 
appear? As a grotesque and distorted medley of bright and meaningless shapes. If the Ambassadors are 
straightened up, the skull is skewed. If the skull is rectified, the two Frenchmen are slanted, fleeing away 
like flying saucers. (16) 
 
The image of the skull introduces into the composition an optic that is fundamentally incompatible 
with that of the stable spectator constructed by the laws of perspective. For, in order to reconfigure the 
incomprehensible image as one that is mimetic of a recognizable object, the spectator must scrutinise 
it from an angle that violently disfigures the ambassadors and the instruments that symbolise their 
achievements. In forcing the spectator into the contorted, almost abject posture that Latour describes, 
Holbein deliberately undermines the illusion of solid, three-dimensional reality that he has so 
carefully organised. The composition is dramatically decomposed, and the ideological assumptions on 
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which it had been premised, in particular the assumption that the economic and symbolic forms of 
capital it depicts can in some uncomplicated sense be claimed, or attained, are completely upset. From 
this perspective, the anamorphic perspective, reality itself appears as a meaningless, anarchic smear.  
The death’s head thus makes the cultural and political ambition to which the spectator had initially 
accommodated himself seem meaningless. It does so not by emblematically reminding the spectator 
of death, as in the conventional inclusion of a memento mori (the minutely detailed death’s head 
ornament on Dinteville’s hat does this, and the abstractness, and hence inadequateness, of its allusion 
to death is underlined by the fact that it is practically imperceptible). Instead, the skull that slants 
across the surface of Holbein’s painting aggressively defamiliarises and radicalises the tradition of the 
memento mori. Its superficial abstraction is in fact an index of its concreteness, its almost excessive 
immediacy. For it introduces the idea of death at the level of form as opposed to content. The 
spectator is forced physically to transform himself, even to abase himself, in the face of this death’s 
head. The monstrous, distorted skull does not represent so much as enact death’s ontological 
interruption of life.  
 
As I have intimated, the perspectival device used by Holbein to distort the death’s head in The 
Ambassadors is named anamorphosis. Jurgis Baltrušaitis, the most authoritative modern 
commentator on this trope, has emphasised its philosophical as well as optical importance for the 
history of representation. Anamorphosis, he notes, “plays havoc with elements and principles; instead 
of reducing forms to their visible limits, it projects them outside themselves and distorts them so that 
when viewed from a certain point they return to normal” (1). An anamorphic image posits the coded 
presence of an almost unrepresentable alternative reality that momentarily obtrudes on reality as it is 
ordinarily understood, thereby rendering the latter oddly arbitrary and ontologically inconsistent. 
Holbein’s skull, for example, is metonymic of a domain in which the commodities that advertise the 
ambassadors’ economic, political and symbolic capital have neither exchange value nor use value. 
From an anamorphic perspective, the empirical reality that this painting appears so painstakingly to 
reconstruct is emptied of signification. Reality as it is ordinarily understood must in this portrait 
compete with an almost completely incompatible alternative that threatens to be even more 
compelling. The effect of anamorphosis, philosophically speaking, is therefore an extreme 
relativisation. Anamorphic perspective radically subjectifies the act of seeing, and so exposes the fact 
that linear perspective, dependent as it is on the mythical idea that there is one motionless point from 
which the subject can adequately perceive the object, is itself far from objective. It is an immanent 
critique of perspective.  
 
It is because it constitutes a signal challenge to the idea of a stable subject, as to a singular, linear 
perspective, that the idea of anamorphosis has recently proved attractive to some anti-humanist 
philosophers. In the 1970s, influenced by the publication of Baltrušaitis’s monograph about 
anamorphic art, which had appeared in Paris in 1955, both Lacan and Lyotard produced books that 
used The Ambassadors for the cover. Lacan’s The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis 
(1973) reproduced the image in its entirety in order to argue that Holbein uses the anamorphic 
perspective of the “gaze,” identified with objet a, to make visible “the subject as annihilated” (88). And 
Lyotard’s Discours, Figure (1971), which discusses the painting as an exemplum of his thesis that the 
representational planes of paintings are necessarily non-identical to themselves, reproduced a detail 
of the anamorphic skull when it appeared in its second edition in 1978 (376-9).  
 
More recently, Slavoj Žižek has brilliantly elaborated Lacan’s comments on The Ambassadors. He 
emphasises that the anamorphic stain that obtrudes into the composition is a “phallic” detail that 
denatures Holbein’s “idyllic surface scene.” The “true meaning of the picture” is revealed, according to 
him, once the anamorphic image, glanced from a lateral perspective on the threshold of the room in 
which it is exhibited, has acquired the contours of the skull. And this “true meaning” is “the nullity of 
all terrestrial goods, objects of art and knowledge that fill out the rest of the picture.” He continues: 
 
the “phallic” element of a picture is a meaningless stain that “denatures” it, rendering all its constituents 
“suspicious,” and thus opens up the abyss of the search for a meaning—nothing is what it seems to be, 
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everything is to be interpreted, everything is supposed to possess some supplementary meaning. The 
ground of the established, familiar signification opens up; we find ourselves in a realm of total ambiguity, 
but this lack propels us to produce ever new “hidden meanings”: it is a driving force of endless 
compulsion. The oscillation between lack and surplus meaning constitutes the proper dimension of 
subjectivity. In other words, it is by means of the “phallic” spot that the observed picture is subjectivized: 
this paradoxical point undermines our position as “neutral,” “objective” observer, pinning us to the 
observed object itself. (90-91) 
 
The scratched surface of the pier-glass in Middlemarch, to return to my example from nineteenth-
century literature, is the equivalent of Holbein’s anamorphic skull in The Ambassadors. Eliot’s image 
of the mirror is, in Žižek’s terms, the “phallic” spot on the novel’s canvas that provides a kind of portal 
into a “realm of total ambiguity.” It is the smear that radically subjectivises its representation of 
reality, undermining the omniscient narrator’s claim to be neutral and objective. Abruptly, it opens up 
a perspective that enables the reader to glimpse a reality repressed by “the established, familiar 
signification” of the realist aesthetic; a reality that is purely contingent, aleatory.  
 
The almost unthinkable logic of Eliot’s parable of the pier-glass, as J. Hillis Miller has put it, is that 
“what is ‘really there’ has no order whatsoever, but is merely random scratches without pattern or 
meaning” (140). And Eliot cannot of course countenance this. As Miller emphasises, “the idea that 
reality is chaotic, without order or form, and the corollary that any order it may appear to have is 
projected illicitly by some patterning ego” is, officially at least, contradicted both by Eliot’s celebrated 
metaphors for the organic unity of social life, like the web, and by “the generalizing, rationalizing, 
order-finding activity of the narrator throughout the book” (140). Unofficially, though, Middlemarch 
momentarily admits the idea that reality is chaotic. And Miller too patently cannot countenance this 
idea. “It would seem hardly plausible,” he rather plaintively protests, “to say that reality for Eliot is a 
chaotic disorder.” In an effort to console himself for the sense of existential homelessness that Eliot’s 
metaphor induces, he adds: 
 
It might seem more likely that this is an irrelevant implication of the parable, an implication which has by 
accident, as it were, slipped in along with the implications which are “intended.” A decision about this 
must be postponed. (140)  
 
Miller likes to think that the shocking philosophical implication of the parable of the pier-glass is 
purely accidental (though revealingly he also leaves open the possibility that it is deliberate). I prefer 
to think that, even if she finally forecloses the idea that reality is chaotic, because she cannot accept its 
philosophical, its existential implications, Eliot nonetheless flirts for an instant with the experimental 
potential of an aleatory realism. She recognises that the anamorphic stain that the metaphor of the 
mirror constitutes also paradoxically frames the novel’s representation of reality. In Žižek’s language, 
it is “the heterogeneous element that must remain an inert, nonsensical ‘blot’ if the rest of the picture 
is to acquire the consistency of a symbolic reality” (95). 
Perhaps what I am here calling aleatory realism, which is in the end the formal possibility of 
representing reality as meaningless, as something “minutely and multitudinously scratched in all 
directions,” is comparable to what Jameson, in some recent comments on the prospects presently 
open to the realist aesthetic, has enigmatically described as “existential realism”:  
 
This mode is predicated on what used to be called the death of the subject, or more precisely, the 
effacement of the individual personality or character, its survival in an impersonal consciousness beyond 
identity and individuality. Here narrative withdraws from the outer person into an impersonal and 
anonymous confrontation with situation and things, a blank third-person narrative in which only a pure 
present of time and space is registered, yet a pure present which includes velleities and intentions, 
movements and gestures, flashes of memory and bits and pieces of the larger projects, familiar glimpses of 
routine and repetition: but only insofar as the edges of all those dimensions are visible in a present of time. 
Existential realism thus offers the satisfactions of experience without any of the perspectives that might 
have been drawn on to interpret or indeed to change it; yet as a narrative mode it is clearly not inseparable 
from the empirical reality of the older realisms, and, while no longer subjectivist, is perfectly consistent 
with experimental variation and with the positing of alternate pasts or futures. (“A Note” 270-71) 
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Existential realism, in Jameson’s formulation, is the acceptable, practicable face of the aleatory 
realism I have postulated. It is the attempt to reproduce those multitudinous, minute scratches in a 
readable form, that is, as “a pure present which includes velleities and intentions, movements and 
gestures, flashes of memory and bits and pieces of the larger projects, familiar glimpses of routine and 
repetition.” It is a realism beyond realism, to be sure, since it deliberately supersedes narrative, at 
least in a linear or concentric form; but it nonetheless remains a realism, because it uses an 
anamorphic perspective to confront precisely the question that Lyotard claimed classic realism 
constitutively avoided, “the question of reality implicated in that of art.” 
 
 
   
Notes 
 
1
For a more extensive discussion of this idea, see Beaumont.  
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